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Abstract
Recently coded caching has emerged as a promising means to handle continuously increasing
wireless traffic. However, coded caching requires users to cooperate in order to minimize the overall
transmission rate. How users with heterogeneous preferences cooperate in coded caching and how to
calculate the resulting caching gains are still open problems. In this paper, a two-phase cache-aided
network is investigated, in which users with heterogeneous preferences are served by a base station
through a shared link. Effective throughput is considered as a performance metric. It is proved that the
achievable domain of effective throughputs is a convex set and can be characterized by its boundary. A
special type of caching schemes, named uncoded placement absolutely-fair (UPAF) caching, is studied.
For the two-user case, games are formulated to allocate effective throughput gains for the two users.
For the general multiuser case, a UPAF policy is proposed to organize user cooperation. It is shown
that users with more concentrated preferences can obtain higher effective throughputs.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Thanks to the popularization of mobile devices and the rise of multimedia applications,
wireless traffic has undergone dramatic growth in recent years. In the era of 5G, various wireless
communication technologies have been developed to improve network capacity and handle the
ever-increasing traffic, including polar codes, massive multi-input and multi-output, millimeter
wave, etc. Notice that a significant feature of current wireless traffic is that content items are
generated much earlier than they are requested. Caching has emerged as an inexpensive and
powerful solution to cope with increasing wireless traffic by pre-storing popular content items
in user terminals before users request them [1].
By shifting traffic at peak hours to idle hours, caching can exploit idle communication
resources. Wireless networks benefit from caching in many aspects. Since content items can be
provided for users from closer nodes rather than the core network, caching contributes to lower
latency communications [2]. From an information theoretic perspective, the fundamental latency-
cache tradeoff was revealed in [3] by introducing a performance metric termed normalized
delivery time. Considerable attention has also been paid to improving energy efficiency through
caching in wireless networks [4]-[6]. In [4], an in-memory storage method was proposed to
reduce energy consumption in edge caching. The mismatch between the randomly arrived energy
and content requests was eliminated by caching in energy harvesting networks [5]. The energy
efficiency gains from caching in interference channels were revealed in [6]. In millimeter wave
communications, caching helps to enhance mobility support and reduce handover failures [7].
A cost-optimal caching scheme was proposed for device-to-device (D2D) networks with user
mobility in [8]. The effective throughput resulting from caching, which indicates the reduction
in the real-time traffic, was investigated in [9]-[12].
Recently, a caching method termed coded caching has attracted considerable attention [13]-
[19], because it can provide global caching gains. The seminal works [13] and [14] studied a two-
phase (placement phase and delivery phase) system and first revealed the fundamental memory-
rate tradeoff for coded caching. Thereafter, the exact memory-rate tradeoff for coded caching
with uncoded prefetching was characterized in [15]. Coded caching was further extended to D2D
communications in [16]. It was shown that coded caching can create multicasting opportunities
3for overloaded multi-input single-output channels [17]. The work [18] provided a coded caching
scheme for multiple-server networks. An order-optimal coded caching scheme was proposed to
meet users’ privacy requirement in [19].
In present multimedia applications, a few popular content items typically account for the
majority of network traffic [20]. User preferences on these popular content items have been shown
to play a critical role in designing caching schemes [21]. Various caching schemes were developed
to improve network capability by taking advantage of content popularity [22]-[26]. The work
[22] proposed femtocaching to reduce downloading delay according to network topology and
popularity distributions. A file grouping scheme was developed to handle the uneven preferences
in cache-aided networks [23]. For content items with discrete popularities, [24] proposed a near-
optimal coded caching scheme to reduce network load. The memory-rate tradeoff for coded
caching under uneven popularities was revealed in [25] and [26]. Game theoretic techniques
were also adopted to design caching and pricing strategies [27]-[28].
In previous studies, the focus has been on improving network performance for the sake of
servers. For example, [13]-[14] devoted to reduce the load that the server sustains and [29] tried
to lower the overall energy consumption. Less attention has been paid to the revenue that an
individual user can obtain from caching. Thanks to the progress of big data technologies, user
preferences can be analyzed based on private browsing history and social relationships [30]-[31].
Existing studies have mostly ignored users’ personal differences by assuming that all the users
have the same probability of requesting a content item [22]-[28]. However, user preferences have
a significant impact on caching gains. If a user is interested in only a few content items, i.e., the
user requests are deterministic or near-deterministic, this user’s buffer can be filled with these
content items. This user can find the desired content items directly when it issues requests. As
a result, this user obtains a high effective throughput from caching. If a user is interested in
many content items, the above mechanism does not work due to the buffer size constraint. It
can cooperate with other users by coded caching to split the transmission cost. Few works have
focused on how to calculate each user’s caching gain in this case.
In this paper, we investigate effective throughput from caching for users with heterogeneous
preferences. More specifically, multiple users are served by a base station through a shared link
and user preferences are characterized by a probability measure. Similar to the model considered
4in [13] and [14], the network works in two phases, a placement phase and a delivery phase.
In the placement phase, network load is light and user buffers are filled through idle spectra.
In the delivery phase, user requests are revealed and the base station transmits messages to
help the users recover the desired content items. Effective throughput is used as a performance
metric, which indicates the reduction in the transmission cost in the delivery phase. Each user’s
effective throughput is calculated individually. To characterize the whole achievable domain of
effective throughputs, we need to investigate all the feasible placement and delivery policies,
which is however of prohibitive complexity. Upon that, we prove the convexity of the achievable
domain and focus on a special type of policies, termed uncoded placement absolutely-fair (UPAF)
policies. The achievable domain under UPAF policies is shown to be a polygon in the two-user
case.
The higher the effective throughput a user obtains, the lower the real-time transmission cost
this user affords. If the users are selfish and each user wishes to maximize its own effective
throughput, the users form a game relationship. Based on the analysis on achievable domain in
the two-user case, a noncooperative game is formulated to investigate the effective throughput
equilibrium between the two users. In addition, a cooperative game is studied to allocate the
revenue of cooperation, which helps in designing pricing policies. Suffering from the hardness
in finding a Nash equilibrium in noncooperative games, a low-complexity numerical algorithm
is proposed to give a reasonable revenue allocation for the two users. An algorithm is also
presented to organize user cooperation in the general multiuser case.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents our system model and the
formal definition of placement and delivery policies. Section III proves the convexity of the
achievable domain of effective throughputs and investigates the achievable domain for the two-
user case in detail. Games among two users are studied in Section IV. Section V presents a
cooperation scheme for the general multiuser case. Simulation results are given in Section VI.
Finally, Section VII concludes this paper and suggests some directions for future research.
II. PROBLEM SETTING
We introduce the system model in Subsection II-A, provide the definition of effective through-
put in Subsection II-B, and then present an example to illustrate the research motivation in
5Subsection II-C.
A. System Model
Consider a Base Station (BS) connected with K users through a shared error-free link. The
BS has access to a database of N content items, denoted by W1, . . . ,WN . Assume that all the
content items have an identical size of F bits. Let Ω = {Wn : n ∈ [N ]} denote the collection
of bits of the content items.1 User k is equipped with a buffer of bkF bits, or equivalently,
bk content items. We refer to B = [b1, ..., bK ] as buffer size vector. Let dk,n indicate whether
user k asks for content item Wn, i.e., dk,n = 1 if user k asks for Wn and dk,n = 0 otherwise.
We refer to D = (dk,n)K×N as the demand matrix, which is a random matrix with support set
{0, 1}K×N . Then user preferences can be characterized by a probability measure on D, denoted
as P . In practice, user preferences can be analyzed based on private browsing history and social
relationships [30]-[31]. The probability that user k requests Wn is given by pk,n = P({D :
dk,n = 1}). The matrix P = (pk,n)K×N is referred to as the user preference matrix. It should be
noted that we do not assume that each user requests only one content item. In other words, the
summations
∑
n∈[N ] dk,n and
∑
n∈[N ] pk,n may not be 1.
This cache-aided network operates in two phases, namely a placement phase and a delivery
phase. In the placement phase, user requests are not specific. The users prefetch data from the
BS and cache them in their buffers with the knowledge of the probability measure P . In the
delivery phase, the users issue requests for the content items. The demand matrix D reduces to a
deterministic matrix Dˆ = (dˆk,n)K×N . Local buffers provide useful information in recovering the
requested content items. The users probably also need to turn to the BS in order to recover all
the requested content items. The network described above is referred to as (B, N,P)-Caching.
B. Formal Problem Statement
We provide a formal description of placement and delivery policies for (B, N,P)-Caching.
Definition 1. A placement and delivery policy pi =
(
(pipk)k∈[K], (pi
g
U)U⊆[K], (pi
r
k)k∈[K]
)
consists of
the following three types of functions.
1For a positive integer A, [A] denotes the set {1, 2, ..., A}
6i) Content prefetching function (pipk)k∈[K]: For each user k, pi
p
k determines the bits prefetched
from the BS in the placement phase and thus gives this user’s buffer state in the beginning of
the delivery phase. Specifically, we have
pipk : (Wn)n∈[N ],P → Ck. (1)
Due to the buffer size constraint, Ck should satisfy |Ck| ≤ bkF .2
ii) Message generation function (pigU)U⊆[K]: In the delivery phase, user requests are revealed and
hence Dˆ is known. For each subset U of [K], pigU generates a message MU according to Ck and
Dˆ, i.e.,
pigU : (Wn)n∈[N ], Ck, Dˆ →MU . (2)
The message MU is generated to help users in U recover the requested content items.
iii) Content recovering function (pirk)k∈[K]: After receiving the transmitted messages, each user
attempts to recover the requested content items by pirk, i.e.,
pirk : Ck, (MU)U :k∈U → {Wˆ kn : n ∈ Dˆk}, (3)
where Dˆk = {n : dˆk,n = 1} represents the set of content items requested by user k.3 Wˆ kn stands
for the estimated Wn.
For a placement and delivery policy pi, the error probability is defined as
max
k∈[K]
max
n∈[N ]
Pr{Wˆ kn 6= Wn|dk,n = 1}, (4)
where Pr{·|·} denotes the conditional probability. Given a (B, N,P)-Caching, there are numerous
placement and delivery policies that can satisfy the user requests. A traditional one is just to
ignore user buffers and transmit the requested content items in the delivery phase directly.
Caching and multicasting enable us to satisfy user requests in a more effective manner. For a
policy pi, we define the effective throughput of user k as
Rk =
1
F
ED
∑
n∈[N ]
Fdk,n −
∑
U :k∈U
|MU |
|U|

=
∑
n∈[N ]
pk,n − ED
(∑
U :k∈U
|MU |
|U|F
)
,
(5)
2For a set S, |S| denotes its cardinality.
3U : k ∈ U traverses all the subsets of [K] that contain k.
7where ED(·) denotes the mathematical expectation with respect to the random matrix D. The
summation
∑
n∈[N ] Fdk,n stands for the number of bits transmitted to user k in the delivery phase
without caching and multicasting. Because MU is transmitted to |U| users, each user incurs 1|U|
cost of the transmission. Then,
∑
U :k∈U
|MU |
|U|F indicates the total transmission cost afforded by
user k. In addition, we normalize the transmission cost by 1
F
. Thus, the effective throughput
defined in Eq. (5) represents the reduction in the transmission cost of user k.
The summation of all users’ effective throughputs has∑
k∈[K]
Rk =
∑
k∈[K]
∑
n∈[N ]
pk,n − 1
F
∑
U⊆[K]
ED (|MU |) . (6)
Note that
∑
k∈[K]
∑
n∈[N ] pk,n and
∑
U⊆[K] ED (|MU |) represent the expected number of content
items requested by the users and the total number of bits transmitted by the BS, respectively.
The right-hand side of Eq. (6) indicates the reduction in the number of the bits transmitted by
the BS due to caching and multicasting (normalized by the content size F ). Thus, Rk indicates
the revenue of user k from caching. As caching schemes studied in previous literatures like [13]-
[16], the proposed policies may incur a high signaling overhead. This overhead can be partly
eliminated by large content items.
Users’ effective throughputs vary with policies. All the possible values of effective throughputs
form an achievable domain.
Definition 2. The vector (Rk)k∈[K] is achievable if for every ε > 0 and every sufficiently large
F there exists a policy pi = pi(ε, F ) that achieves (Rk)k∈[K] with error probability lower than ε.
For a (B, N,P)-Caching, the achievable domain of effective throughputs is defined as
R(B, N,P) = {(Rk)k∈[K] : (Rk)k∈[K] is achievable}. (7)
If no confusion arises, we simply denoteR(B, N,P) byR. The achievable domainR depends
on the buffer size vector, the number of content items, as well as user preferences.
C. A Motivating Example
In this subsection, we present a demo to illustrate the research motivation and the impact of
user preferences on effective throughputs. As shown in Fig. 1, two users are interested in two
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Noncooperation
Cost (A, A) (A, B) (B, A) (B, B)         ET
User 1 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.75
User 2 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.75
3
Cost (A, A) (A, B) (B, A) (B, B)         ET
User 1 0 0 1 0.5 0.9925
User 2 0 1 0 0.5 0.5025
Fig. 1. Effective throughputs under different caching schemes. The pair (A,A) in the tables stands for the realization when both
the two users request content A and the other pairs are similar. ET is short for effective throughput.
content items, denoted as A and B. Each user at most caches one content item. User 1 requests
the two content items with probability 99% and 1%, respectively. User 2 requests the two content
items with an identical probability, 50%. In this demo, we assume each user requests only one
content item. The coded caching scheme suggests to divide each content item into two portions
and then the user requests can always be satisfied by transmitting a coded packet of size 0.5
[13]. Then both the two users achieve an effective throughput 0.75. The coded caching scheme
requires the two users cooperate in both the two phases. Let us consider a noncooperation scheme
that each user caches the most popular content items. The two users split the transmission costs
if the delivered data are useful for both the two users. It is seen that user 1 achieves a much
higher effective throughput in the noncooperation scheme than it does in coded caching. As a
result, user preferences have a significant impact on caching gains and should be taken into
account in cache-aided networks.
III. PROPERTY OF THE ACHIEVABLE DOMAIN
In this section, we prove the convexity of the achievable domain of effective throughputs and
then focus on a special type of placement and delivery policies, termed UPAF policies. It will
be shown that (B, N,P)-Caching with two users has an achievable domain as a polygon under
UPAF policies.
A. Convexity of the Achievable Domain
The following theorem presents the convexity of the achievable domain of effective through-
puts .
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Fig. 2. Convex set in the positive orthant. This set can be completely characterized by its boundary in the positive orthant.
Theorem 1. For any (B, N,P)-Caching, the achievable domain R is a convex set and for any
point (Rk)k∈[K] ∈ R,
{(xk)k∈[K] : 0 ≤ xk ≤ Rk} ⊆ R. (8)
Proof. Let (R1k)k∈[K] and (R
2
k)k∈[K] be two points in R, as illustrated in Fig. 2. To prove the
convexity, we only need to show that (αR1k+(1−α)R2k)k∈[K] also belongs toR for any α ∈ (0, 1).
Given ε > 0 and F large enough, suppose pi1 = pi1(ε, αF ) and pi2 = pi2(ε, (1 − α)F ) achieve
(R1k)k∈[K] and (R
2
k)k∈[K] with error probability lower than ε. We divide each content item into
two portions, containing αF bits and (1−α)F bits respectively. By further dividing each buffer
into two portions of size αbkF bits and (1 − α)bkF bits, the original (B, N,P)-Caching can
be viewed as two (B, N,P)-Caching with different content sizes. The policies pi1 and pi2 can
be respectively applied in the two (B, N,P)-Caching. The error probability is bounded by
1− (1− ε)2 = 2ε− ε2. The effective throughput of user k is given by
Rk =
∑
n∈[N ]
pk,n − ED
(∑
U :k∈U
|M1U |+ |M2U |
|U|F
)
=α
∑
n∈[N ]
pk,n − ED
(∑
U :k∈U
|M1U |
|U|αF
)+(1− α)
∑
n∈[N ]
pk,n − ED
(∑
U :k∈U
|M2U |
|U|(1− α)F
)
=αR1k + (1− α)R2k,
where M1U and M
2
U are messages generated by pi1 and pi2 respectively. For any α ∈ (0, 1),
(αR1k + (1 − α)R2k)k∈[K] can be achieved by combining pi1 and pi2 for sufficiently large F .
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Hence, R is a convex set.
Eq. (8) implies that if a point (Rk)k∈[K] is in R, any point (xk)k∈[K] such that 0 ≤ xk ≤
Rk also belongs to R. We prove that by constructing a policy achieving (xk)k∈[K]. Suppose
pi(ε, F ) achieves (Rk)k∈[K] ∈ R with error probability lower than ε. In the delivery phase,
pi(ε, F ) transmits M{k} to user user k exclusively. Let us consider a new policy in which the BS
additionally transmits a random message of (Rk − xk)F bits to user k. For this new policy, the
error probability remains unchanged while the effective throughputs reduce to (xk)k∈[K]. Thus,
(xk)k∈[K] is achievable.
According to Theorem 1, we only need to pay attention to the boundary in the positive orthant
in order to characterize R, as illustrated in Fig. 2. In addition, we can have more insights on the
achievable domain of (B, N,P)-Caching. The values of different users’ effective throughputs
are interchangeable. When a policy brings one user a high effective throughput, the other users
may only obtain low effective throughputs.
It is intractable to investigate all the feasible policies and characterize the whole achievable
domain of effective throughputs. In the paper, we focus on absolutely fair (AF) policies.
Definition 3. A policy pi is absolutely fair if each user in U can obtain the same amount of
useful information from the message MU , i,e,
I(MU ; {Wn : n ∈ Dˆk}|Ck) = I(MU ; {Wn : n ∈ Dˆj}|Cj) (9)
for k, j ∈ U .4
By enforcing other users receive the bits needed only by a certain user, the transmission cost
of this user can be simply reduced. In an AF policy, such enforcement is forbidden. In other
words, all the users are fair and no one incurs transmission costs for other users. If an AF policy
has an uncoded placement process, the policy is referred to as a UPAF policy. In the rest of the
paper, our attention will be paid to UPAF policies. The significance of studying UPAF policies is
twofold. Theoretically, UPAF policies provide an inner bound for the whole achievable domain.
In addition, UPAF policies are practical, since all the users are fairly treated and the placement
process is simpler compared with a coded one.
4I(·; ·|·) represents the conditional mutual information.
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Fig. 3. Venn Diagram of XU and YU .
B. The Achievable Domain for (B, N,P)-Caching with Two Users
In this subsection, we investigate the achievable domain of (B, N,P)-Caching with two users.
A policy pi maps the content items and requests into the buffer states (Ck)k∈[K] and the transmitted
messages (MU)U⊆[K]. Thus we can use (Ck)k∈[K] and (MU)U⊆[K] to represent the policy pi. To
characterize R for the two-user case, we only need to study all feasible C1, C2,M{1},M{2}, and
M{1,2}.
For a UPAF policy, we have C1, C2 ⊆ Ω. Let us define
X∅ = Ω \ (C1 ∪ C2), (10)
X{1} = C1 \ C2, (11)
X{2} = C2 \ C1, (12)
X{1,2} = C1 ∩ C2. (13)
Then, XU stands for the bits exclusively cached in the buffer of user k for k ∈ U . It is seen
that C1 = X{1} ∪ X{1,2} and C2 = X{2} ∪ X{1,2}. In the delivery phase, the demand matrix
Dˆ is known. Then, user 1 and user 2 wish to recover the bits in Q1 = {Wn : n ∈ Dˆ1} and
Q2 = {Wn : n ∈ Dˆ2}, respectively. We define
Y{1} = (Q1 \ C1) \ (Q2 \ C2) , (14)
Y{2} = (Q2 \ C2) \ (Q1 \ C1) , (15)
Y{1,2} = (Q1 \ C1) ∩ (Q2 \ C2) . (16)
Then YU is the set of bits requested only by users in U but not cached in the buffers of these
users. As a result, users in U want to recover YU from the transmitted messages. Fig. 3 illustrates
the relations between XU and YU .
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To satisfy user requests in the delivery phase, we can simply set M{1} = Y{1},M{2} = Y{2},
and M{1,2} = Y{1,2}. Notice that user 1 contains a part of bits that user 2 requests and vice versa.
Index coding can be applied to create more multicasting opportunities and improve the effective
throughputs of both user 1 and user 2 [32]. In this case, the transmission costs of user 1 and
user 2 are given by
R¯1(C1, C2, Dˆ) =
|Y{1}|
F
+
1
2F
|Y{1,2}| − 1
2F
×min{|X{1} ∩ Y{2}|, |X{2} ∩ Y{1}|} , (17)
R¯2(C1, C2, Dˆ) =
|Y{2}|
F
+
1
2F
|Y{1,2}| − 1
2F
×min{|X{1} ∩ Y{2}|, |X{2} ∩ Y{1}|} . (18)
Note that Eqs. (17) and (18) give the minimum transmission costs for given C1, C2, and Dˆ,
because all the possible multicasting opportunities have been exploited.
The transmission costs, i.e., Eqs. (17) and (18), can also be represented as functions of the
two users’ buffer states. To this end, we denote XU ,n = XU ∩Wn. According to De Morgan’s
laws, Eqs. (14)-(16) can be rewritten as
Y{1} =
 ⋃
n∈Dˆ1
X{2},n
⋃ ⋃
n∈Dˆ1\Dˆ2
X∅,n
 , (19)
Y{2} =
 ⋃
n∈Dˆ2
X{1},n
⋃ ⋃
n∈Dˆ2\Dˆ1
X∅,n
 , (20)
Y{1,2} =
⋃
n∈Dˆ1∩Dˆ2
X∅,n. (21)
Defining xU ,n =
|XU,n|
F
and substituting Eqs. (19)-(21) into Eqs. (17)-(18) yield
R¯1(C1, C2, Dˆ) =
∑
n∈Dˆ1
x{2},n +
∑
n∈Dˆ1\Dˆ2
x∅,n +
1
2
∑
n∈Dˆ1∩Dˆ2
x∅,n − 1
2
×
min
∑
n∈Dˆ2
x{1},n,
∑
n∈Dˆ1
x{2},n
 ,
(22)
R¯2(C1, C2, Dˆ) =
∑
n∈Dˆ2
x{1},n +
∑
n∈Dˆ2\Dˆ1
x∅,n +
1
2
∑
n∈Dˆ1∩Dˆ2
x∅,n − 1
2
×
min
∑
n∈Dˆ2
x{1},n,
∑
n∈Dˆ1
x{2},n
 .
(23)
The variable xU ,n stands for how much XU ,n accounts for Wn.
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For fixed uncoded placement C1 and C2, the maximum effective throughputs achieved by
UPAF policies are given by
R1(C1, C2) =
∑
n∈[N ] p1,n − ED
(
R¯1(C1, C2,D)
)
, (24)
R2(C1, C2) =
∑
n∈[N ] p2,n − ED
(
R¯2(C1, C2,D)
)
. (25)
From the proof of Theorem 1, one can see that Theorem 1 also holds for UPAF policies. Thus, the
boundary of the achievable domain under UPAF policies can be given by solving the following
optimization problem:
max
xU,n
αR1(C1, C2) + (1− α)R2(C1, C2)
s.t.
∑
U⊆{1,2}
xU ,n ≤ 1, n ∈ [N ],
∑
U :k∈U
∑
n∈[N ]
xU ,n ≤ bk, k ∈ {1, 2},
xU ,n ≥ 0,U ⊆ {1, 2}, n ∈ [N ].
(26)
The first constraint is due to the fact that the sets xU ,n are disjoint for U ⊆ {1, 2}. The second
constraint forbids buffer overflows in the placement phase. By tuning α from 0 to 1, we obtain
the boundary of the achievable domain of effective throughputs under UPAF policies.
Problem (26) is almost a linear programming (LP) problem except the minimizing opera-
tions. To simplify problem (26), we introduce auxiliary variables zD1,D2 = min
{∑
n∈D2 x{1},n,∑
n∈D1 x{2},n
}
and vectors
x1 = [x{1},1 + x{1,2},1, ..., x{1},N + x{1,2},N ], (27)
x2 = [x{2},1 + x{1,2},1, ..., x{2},N + x{1,2},N ], (28)
x3 = [x{1,2},1, ..., x{1,2},N ], (29)
z = [z∅,∅, ..., z[N ],[N ], 1]. (30)
Then x1 and x2 represent the proportion of each content item cached in user 1 and user 2,
respectively. The vector x3 represents the proportion of each content item cached in both the
two users’ buffers. The vector z is a function of x1,x2, and x3. The last element of z is a fixed
14
constant 1, which is used to express the constant term in Eqs. (24)-(25) later. The constraints
on zD1,D2 are linear:
zD1,D2 ≤
∑
n∈D2
x{1},n, (31)
zD1,D2 ≤
∑
n∈D1
x{2},n. (32)
Then, problem (26) can be transformed into an equivalent LP problem5
max
x1,x2,x3,z
α
(
3∑
i=1
aT1,ixi + b
T
1 z
)
+ (1− α)
(
3∑
i=1
aT2,ixi + b
T
2 z
)
s.t.
3∑
i=1
Aixi +Bz ≤ h,
(33)
where
(∑3
i=1 a
T
k,ixi + b
T
k z
)
gives the effective throughput of user k and Ai,B, as well as
h result from the constraints in problem (26) and Eqs. (31)-(32). It should be noted that the
coefficients a1,i, b1,a2,i, b2 depend on and only on the user preferences. Based on problem (33),
we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2. For (B, N,P)-Caching with two users, the achievable domain under UPAF policies
is a polygon.
Proof. To show the achievable domain under UPAF policies is a polygon, we only need to show
its boundary is piecewise linear. The points in the boundary can be obtained by solving problem
(33). Notice that the constraints of problem (33) are linear and are independent of α. Therefore,
the feasible domain of problem (33) remains unchanged with different values of α.
According to the LP theory, the feasible domain of an LP problem is a convex polytope and
the optimal solution is a vertex of the convex polytope [33].6 Since the number of vertices of a
convex polytope is finite, problem (33) at most achieves finitely many different optimal solutions
when α goes from 0 to 1. As a result, the boundary can be characterized by finitely many points
and therefore is piecewise linear.
5Let v1 = [v11, ..., v1M ] and v2 = [v21, ..., v2M ] be two M -dimensional vectors. By v1 ≤ v2, we mean v1m ≤ v2m for
m ∈ [M ].
6If an LP problem has only one optimal solution, this solution must be a vertex of the convex polytope. If an LP problem
has multiple optimal solutions, at least one of the optimal solutions is a vertex of the convex polytope.
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The achievable domain gathers all the possible values of effective throughputs that can be
achieved by possible placement and delivery policies, no matter it is centralized or decentral-
ized. The higher the effective throughput a user obtains, the lower the transmission cost this
user affords. The boundary of the achievable domain represents the Pareto-efficient effective
throughputs. If the users are selfish and each user only wants to maximize its own effective
throughput, the users form a game relationship. In the next section, games are formulated to
allocate caching gains for (B, N,P)-Caching with two users.
IV. GAMES IN (B, N,P)-CACHING WITH TWO USERS
In this section, a noncooperative game is formulated to investigate the equilibrium on effective
throughputs for (B, N,P)-Caching with two users. Based on the noncooperative game, a coop-
erative game is studied to allocate the caching gains. Furthermore, a low-complexity algorithm
is presented to provide a reasonable effective throughput allocation.
A. Noncooperative Game in (B, N,P)-Caching with Two Users
In this subsection, we investigate a noncooperative game in (B, N,P)-Caching with two users.
More specifically, we assume that the two users fill their buffers individually in the placement
phase. The BS satisfies the user requests in a manner that the number of transmitted bits is
minimized. Each user wishes to maximize its own effective throughput from caching. It will be
shown that the noncooperative game always has a mixed Nash equilibrium (NE). In addition,
the noncooperative game has pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSNEs) when the user preferences
are similar.
In the noncooperative game, the two users take the roles of players. The sets of bits cached
in the user buffers in the placement phase, i.e., C1 and C2, act as strategies. Throughout this
subsection, we consider only UPAF policies. As a result, the strategy sets for this two users are
given by S1 = {C1 ⊆ Ω : |C1| ≤ b1F} and S2 = {C2 ⊆ Ω : |C2| ≤ b2F}. The payoffs for this
two users are the effective throughputs resulting from caching and thus are presented in Eqs.
(24) and (25), respectively. We denote the above noncooperative game as G0 = {S1,S2;R1, R2}.
Nash’s existence theorem guarantees that the noncooperative game in (B, N,P)-Caching with
two users at least has a mixed NE [34].
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Theorem 3. G0 has a mixed NE.
Proof. G0 has finitely many players. In addition, the strategy sets are finite, i.e., |Sk| ≤
(
NF
bkF
)
for k = 1, 2. Thus G0 is a finite game. According to Nash’s existence theorem, G0 has a mixed
NE.
A pure strategy is a bit-by-bit decision over the content items. However, a mixed NE needs
not to divide a bit into smaller parts. Instead, a mixed NE chooses pure strategies according to
a certain distribution. Having proved the existence of a mixed NE, we pay attention to PSNEs.
However, it is computationally prohibitive to find a PSNE and corresponding payoffs for G0,
due to the fact that the strategy sets are of exponential sizes. To overcome that, we construct an
infinite game based on G0.
Note that the strategies C1 and C2 can be completely characterized by x1, x2, and x3. The
payoff functions in G0 can be rewritten as
Rk(x1,x2,x3, z) =
3∑
i=1
aTk,ixi + b
T
k z. (34)
Let us consider a two-player infinite game G1 = {E1, E2; f1, f2}. The strategy sets are feasible
domains of x1 and x2, i.e., E1 = {x ∈ RN : 0 ≤ x ≤ 1,
∑N
n=1 xn ≤ b1} and E2 = {x ∈ RN :
0 ≤ x ≤ 1,∑Nn=1 xn ≤ b2}. The payoff function fk is defined as
fk(x1,x2) = max
x3,z
Rk(x1,x2,x3, z)
= aTk,1x1 + a
T
k,2x2 + gk(x1,x2),
(35)
where
gk(x1,x2) = max
x3,z
aTk,3x3 + b
T
k z
s.t. A3x3 +Bz ≤ h−A1x1 −A2x2,
(36)
where the constraint is equivalent to the one in problem (33). One can see that problem (36)
is also an LP problem. The basic idea to formulate G1 is as follows. Each user decides the
number of bits cached in its own buffer. Thus x1 and x2 act as strategies. When the values of
x1 and x2 are selected, user 1 is granted the privilege to maximize its own effective throughput
by adjusting the values of x3 and z and then yields the payoff function f1(x1,x2). Similarly,
f2(x1,x2) can be derived.
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Lemma 1 presents the relationship between the existences of PSNEs of G0 and G1.
Lemma 1. If G1 has a PSNE (x∗1,x∗2) and there exist x∗3 and z∗ satisfying gk(x∗1,x∗2) =
aTk,3x
∗
3 + b
T
k z
∗, G0 has a PSNE.
Proof. Suppose (x∗1,x
∗
2) is a PSNE of G1. We have
f1(x
∗
1,x
∗
2) ≥ f1(x1,x∗2), for x1 ∈ E1, (37)
f2(x
∗
1,x
∗
2) ≥ f2(x∗1,x2), for x2 ∈ E2. (38)
The condition gk(x∗1,x
∗
2) = a
T
k,3x
∗
3 + b
T
k z
∗ implies that problem (36) has the same optimal
solution (x∗3, z
∗) for both k = 1 and k = 2. Thus, we have
R1(x
∗
1,x
∗
2,x
∗
3, z
∗) ≥ f1(x1,x∗2) ≥ R1(x1,x∗2,x3, z), (39)
R2(x
∗
1,x
∗
2,x
∗
3, z
∗) ≥ f2(x∗1,x2) ≥ R2(x∗1,x2,x3, z). (40)
Let us consider (C∗1 , C
∗
2) satisfying
C∗1∩Wn
F
= x∗1,n,
C∗2∩Wn
F
= x∗2,n, and
C∗1∩C∗2∩Wn
F
= x∗3,n. Eqs.
(39) and (40) can be written as
R1(C
∗
1 , C
∗
2) ≥ R1(C1, C∗2), (41)
R2(C
∗
1 , C
∗
2) ≥ R2(C∗1 , C2). (42)
Thus (C∗1 , C
∗
2) is a PSNE of G0.
Lemma 1 reveals that G0 has a PSNE if G1 has a PSNE and the two users adopt the same
pair values of x3 and z. By applying Debreu’s theorem [35], we can prove that G1 has a PSNE.
Lemma 2. G1 has a PSNE.
Proof. According to Debreu’s theorem, we only need to show that the strategy sets are nonempty
convex compact subsets of an Euclidean space and the payoff functions are continuous and quais-
concave.
The sets E1 and E2 are bounded and closed in RN and thus are also compact. The payoff
functions are maximums of a series of linear functions:
fk(x1,x2) = max
x3,z
3∑
i=1
aTk,ixi + b
T
k z. (43)
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It is seen that fk(x1,x2) is continuous. To prove the quais-concavity of fk(x1,x2), we only need
to show
∑3
i=1 a
T
k,ixi + b
T
k z is quais-concave, according to the properties of quais-concavity. As
a linear function,
∑3
i=1 a
T
k,ixi + b
T
k z is quais-concave.
Based on Lemmas 1 and 2, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Given any B and N , there exists a positive number ε such that if ||a1,3 − a2,3||+
||b1 − b2|| ≤ ε, G0 has PSNEs and the PSNEs are not unique.
Proof. According to Lemmas 1 and 2, we only need to show that problem (36) has the same
optimal solution for k = 1 and k = 2 at the PSNE of G1, when ||a1,3 − a2,3|| + ||b1 − b2|| is
small enough. Notice that the feasible domain of problem (36) remains unchanged with different
values of k. The objective function of problem (36) describes a group of hyperplanes with the
same normal vector (ak,3, bk). The optimal solution happens to be the intersection point of the
feasible domain and a certain hyperplane [33]. If the normal vectors for k = 1 and k = 2 are
close enough, problem (36) achieves its optimization value at the same vertex of its feasible
domain. Thus G0 has a PSNE when the difference between (a1,3, b1) and (a2,3, b2) is small.
Having proved the existence of PSNEs, we now show its non-uniqueness. Let us consider the
dual problem of problem (36):
min
λ≥0
(h−A1x1 −A2x2)T λ
s.t. AT3λ = ak,3,
BTλ = bk.
(44)
Problem (44) is also an LP problem. Let λk denote the optimal solution of problem (44). Then
the payoff functions can be written as fk = aTk,1x1+a
T
k,2x2−λTk (A1x1+A2x2−h). According
to the LP theory, λk is a step function with respect to x1 and x2 [33]. In other words, we have
∂λk
∂x1
= 0, (45)
∂λk
∂x2
= 0, (46)
almost everywhere.
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Suppose (x∗1,x
∗
2) is a PSNE of G1. We require and only require
∂f1
∂x1
∣∣∣∣
(x∗1,x
∗
2)
= 0, (47)
∂f2
∂x2
∣∣∣∣
(x∗1,x
∗
2)
= 0. (48)
Substituting Eqs. (45)-(46) into Eqs. (47)-(48) yields
AT1λ1 = a1,1, (49)
AT2λ2 = a2,1, (50)
which are sufficient and necessary conditions for PSNEs. Since λk is a step function of x1 and
x2, G1 have more than one PSNE, which further certifies that G0 has more than one PSNE.
Since the normal vectors of the hyperplanes are only related to the user preferences, Theorem
4 implies that G0 has PSNEs when the two users’ preferences are similar enough. The buffer
size vector has no effect on the existence of PSNEs of G0. It is worth noting that Theorem 4
does not claim that G0 has no PSNEs when the two users’ preferences differ much. Instead,
simulations demonstrate that G0 has PSNEs at most cases.
Note that the proof of the existence of NE is nonconstructive. Now we pay attention to how
to calculate a NE. Unfortunately, it have been proved that calculating a NE is PPAD-complete,
which is a subclass of NP [37]. The exponential size of the strategy sets also implies the difficulty
of finding a NE. Recall that the core condition that (x1,x2) forms a PSNE is that the two users
reach a consensus on the value of x3 (z is a function of x1,x2, and x3). Based on best response
dynamics, we present Algorithm 1 to give a PSNE with high probability. The core idea behind
Algorithm 1 is to update the two users’ caching schemes, i.e., x1 and x2, alternately. Once the
caching schemes converge and the two users reach the the same x3 in Steps 4 and 5, a PSNE is
found and the program terminates. The parameter T is a positive integer that limits the maximum
number of iterations.
Even though simulations reveal that Algorithm 1 can return a PSNE at most cases, it is likely
that no PSNE is found when the program terminates. That might be because G0 does not have
a PSNE, a bad initialization point is chosen, the number of iterations is not large enough, or
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Algorithm 1 Find a PSNE for (B, N,P)-Caching
Input: B, N,P , T, ε
Output: PSNE (x∗1,x∗2,x∗3)
1: Calculate ak,i and bk according to B, N,P;
2: Randomly initialize x∗1 such that x
∗
1 ≥ 0 and
∑N
n=1 x
∗
1,n ≤ b1;
3: for t = 1 to T do
4: Maximize R2(x1,x2,x3, z) for fixed x1 = x∗1 and obtain the optimal solution x2 = x
∗
2
and x3 = x∗3;
5: Maximize R1(x1,x2,x3, z) for fixed x2 = x∗2 and obtain the optimal solution x1 = x
∗∗
1
and x3 = x∗∗3 ;
6: if ||x∗1 − x∗∗1 ||+ ||x∗3 − x∗∗3 || ≤ ε then
7: break;
8: else
9: x∗1 = x
∗∗
1 ;
10: end if
11: end for
12: return (x∗1,x∗2,x∗3).
other reasons. There is a balance between the probability that Algorithm 1 finds a PSNE and the
computational complexity. Higher T will increase the probability and computational complexity
simultaneously.
Remark 1: In order to construct G0, the two users and the BS should know the user preferences
P . Once P is known and a NE is found, the two users will prefetch data according to the NE
without communicating with each other.
B. Cooperative Game in (B, N,P)-Caching with Two Users
In this subsection, a cooperative game in (B, N,P)-Caching with two users is investigated. A
numerical algorithm is presented to find a PSNE for the two users. Then reasonable allocation
schemes are proposed, which help in designing a pricing policy.
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If the two users do not cooperate with each other and the BS serves each user individually,
i.e., MU = ∅ for |U| ≥ 2, the optimal caching strategy should be caching the content items that
a user requests with the highest probabilities. This scheme is referred to as pure caching. The
effective throughput resulting from pure caching is given by
Rpk =
bCkc∑
n=1
pk,(n) + (Ck − bCkc)pk,(dCke), (51)
where pk,(n) is the n-th largest number among pk,1, ..., pk,N . If the two users does not cooperate
in the placement phase, the payoffs at a NE in the noncooperative game, denoted by Rn1 and R
n
2 ,
indicate their effective throughputs in the delivery phase. If the two users cooperate with each
other from the placement phase, additional profits (effective throughputs) can be obtained from
their alignment. In this case, the two users do not exchange data but their placement policy and
delivery policy are designed jointly. Let Rc denote the total effective throughput resulting from
cooperation, which indicates the reduction in the number of bits transmitted by the BS due to
user cooperation. The core problem in the cooperative game is to design schemes to allocate the
revenue Rc such that the users are willing to participate in cooperation.
Let y = (y1, y2) be an allocation scheme. All the allocation schemes that hold individual
rationality and collective rationality form a core for the cooperative game
C(B, N,P) = {y : y1 ≥ Rn1 , y2 ≥ Rn2 , y1 + y2 = Rc}. (52)
Generally, the core for a cooperative game is likely to be empty [36]. However, the following
theorem reveals that C(B, N,P) is nonempty.
Theorem 5. C(B, N,P) is nonempty for any B, N , and P .
Proof. To prove this theorem, we only need to show Rn1 +R
n
2 ≤ Rc. According to Theorem 1, all
the achievable values of effective throughputs form a convex set R. Thus we have (Rn1 , Rn2 ) ∈ R
no matter the payoffs are achieved by a mixed NE or a PSNE. The effective throughput from
cooperation is given by Rc = max(y1,y2)∈R(y1 + y2), which ensures that R
n
1 +R
n
2 ≤ Rc.
All the allocation schemes in C(B, N,P) are acceptable for rational users. In cooperative
games, the satisfaction degree of a player on an allocation scheme is usually measured by
the difference between the payoff resulting from noncooperative game and the allocation, i.e.,
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Algorithm 2 Allocation Scheme for (B, N,P)-Caching
Input: B, N,P , T, ε
Output: Allocation (Rc1, Rc2)
1: Calculate Rc by setting α = 0.5 in Eq. ( 26 ) and doubling the optimization value;
2: Call Algorithm 1 and obtain (x∗1,x
∗
2,x
∗
3);
3: if (x∗1,x∗2,x∗3) is a PSNE then
4: Calculate Rn1 and R
n
2 according to Eq. (34);
5: Calculate Rc1 and R
c
2 according to Eq. (53);
6: else
7: Calculate Rp1 and R
p
2 according to Eq. (51);
8: Calculate Rc1 and R
c
2 according to Eq. (54);
9: end if
10: return (Rc1, Rc2).
Rnk − yk. The lower the difference, the higher the degree of satisfaction. By maximizing the
minimum satisfaction degrees among the two users, we reach an unique allocation scheme
Rck = R
n
k +
Rc −Rn1 −Rn2
2
, (53)
which is usually referred to as the nucleolus in cooperative games and happens to be the Shapley
values [38]. It is seen that Rc1 +R
c
2 = R
c and Rck ≥ Rnk according to Theorem 5.
Considering that Rc represents the overall effective throughput, we only need to set α = 0.5
in problem (33) and multiply the optimization value by two in order to obtain Rc. The payoffs
Rc1 and R
c
2 also play a key role in the allocation scheme presented in Eq. (53) and can be
obtained by Algorithm 1 with high probability. For the case that no PSNE is found in Algorithm
1, we suggest to allocate the cooperation gain according to Rpk. More specifically, the effective
throughput is given by
Rck = R
p
k +
Rc −Rp1 −Rp2
2
. (54)
Again, we have Rc1 +R
c
2 = R
c and Rck ≥ Rpk.
Algorithm 2 summarizes the process of constructing an allocation scheme for the cooperative
game in (B, N,P)-Caching with two users. Algorithm 2 can give an allocation scheme within
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low complexity but might not be fair enough when no NE is found. The possible unfairness
results from the inherent hardness of computing NEs for noncooperative games.
V. (B, N,P)-CACHING IN THE GENERAL MULTIUSER CASE
In this section, we investigate (B, N,P)-Caching in the general multiuser case. A noncooper-
ative game for (B, N,P)-Caching with multiple users is formulated. However, it is intractable
to find the NEs of this noncooperative game due to its large scale and payoffs. As a result, an
algorithm is presented to give a placement and delivery policy directly.
We consider uncoded placement processes in this section. Then the buffer states satisfy Ck ⊆ Ω
for k ∈ [K]. Again, the K users act as players. User k’s strategy set is given by Smk = {Ck ∈
Ω : |Ck| ≤ bkF}. After a strategy profile (C1, ..., CK) ∈
∏
k∈[K] Smk is selected and the demand
matrix D is revealed, the BS applies index coding to minimize the total effective throughput.
The resulting effective throughput of user k is denoted by Rmk (C1, ..., CK ,D). Thus the payoff
of user k is given by Rmk = ED (Rmk (C1, ..., CK ,D)). If the K users prefetch data individually
in the placement phase, they form a noncooperative game Gm = {Sm1 , ...,SmK ;Rm1 , ..., RmK}. It is
intractable to find the NEs of Gm since the strategy sets are of exponential sizes and closed-form
expressions of the payoffs are not derived.
Instead of calculating a NE, we present a UPAF policy to organize user cooperation directly
in the following. Let us denote
XU =
⋂
k∈U
Ck \
⋃
k/∈U
Ck. (55)
Then, XU denotes the set of bits cached exclusively in users in U . The demand matrix Dˆ
is revealed in the delivery phase. The set of bits that user k wants to recover is given by
Qk = {Wn, n ∈ Dˆk}. We denote
YU ,V =
(⋂
k∈U
(Qk \ Ck) \
⋃
k/∈U
(Qk \ Ck)
)⋂
XV . (56)
Then, YU ,V stands for the set of bits requested only by users in U and cached only by users in
V . One can see that the sets YU ,V are disjoint for different U or V , and YU ,V = ∅ if U ∩ V 6= ∅.
In the delivery phase, the requests for the content items can be decomposed into requests
for the sets YU ,V . The BS needs to transmits messages to help the users recover YU ,V . A rough
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UPAF policy is just to set MU =
⋃
V⊆[K] YU ,V . Notice that every user caches side information
that others are interested in. Users can cooperate to obtain higher effective throughputs by index
coding. We define
ZU ,V =
⋃
S:V⊆S
YU ,S . (57)
Then, ZU ,V is the set of bits requested only by users in U and at least cached by users in V . For
two sets ZU1,V1 and ZU2,V2 , it is seen that ZU1,V1 ∩ ZU2,V2 = ∅ if U1 6= U2, and ZU1,V1 ⊆ ZU2,V2
if U1 = U2 and V2 ⊆ V1. Let us consider J set pairs {(Uj,Vj) : j ∈ [J ]} satisfying
Ui ⊆ Vj, i 6= j,
Ui ∩ Vj = ∅, i = j.
(58)
It can be verified that Eq. (58) ensures that ZUj ,Vj are disjoint for j ∈ [J ]. Let ZtUj ,Vj denote
the t-th bit in ZUj ,Vj . By transmitting ⊕j∈[J ]ZtUj ,Vj to users in
⋃
j∈[J ] Uj , users in Uj can recover
ZtUj ,Vj , because all the other bits have been cached in the buffers of users in Uj . The transmission
cost of one bit is 1∑
j∈[J] |Uj | . To maximize the effective throughputs, we need to carefully group
ZU ,V .
A grouping method for ZU ,V is presented in Algorithm 3. The bk most popular content items
are cached in the buffer of user k in the placement phase.7 For each subset U ⊆ [K], we create a
group of set pairs {(Uj,U \Uj)} according to the demand matrix Dˆ. Each coded bit is generated
by taking a bit from ZUj ,U\Uj . In Steps 9 to 13, the sets ZU ,V are updated. If some bits cannot
be recovered from the coded bits, these bits are added to MU in Steps 16 to 18. It is seen that
Algorithm 3 is absolutely fair, because each user in U can recover H(MU) bits from MU .8 Since
each user prefetches data individually in the placement phase, Algorithm 3 is decentralized.
Let R3k be the effective throughput of user k from Algorithm 3. We have the following theorem.
Theorem 6. R3k ≥ Rpk for all k.
Proof. In Algorithm 3, users recover some bits from coded messages ⊕j∈[J ]ZtUj ,U\Uj . The trans-
mission cost of bits recovered from these messages is 1|U| , lower than 1. Thus, R
3
k ≥ Rpk.
7If bk is not an integer, user k caches the bbkc most popular content items and bk−bbkc of the dbke-th most popular content
item in its buffer.
8H(·) denotes the entropy.
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Algorithm 3 A UPAF Policy for the General Multiuser Case
Placement Phase:
1: Cache the bk most popular content items in the buffer of user k, i.e., Ck = {Wn :
pn,k is one of bk largest numbers for fixed k};
Delivery Phase:
2: Compute YU ,V and ZU ,V according to Dˆ;
3: Initialization: MU = ∅ for U ⊆ [K];
4: for k = K,K − 1, ..., 1 do
5: for U ⊆ [K] and |U| = k do
6: Split U into J disjoint subsets (Uj)j∈[J ] such that users in Uj ask for the same content
items, i.e., Uk1 and Uk2 are classified into the same subset if Dˆk1 = Dˆk2;
7: T = minj∈[J ] |ZUj ,U\Uj |;
8: MU = MU ∪
{
⊕j∈[J ]ZtUj ,U\Uj : t ∈ [T ]
}
;
9: for j ∈ [J ] do
10: for S ⊆ U \ Uj do
11: ZUj ,S = ZUj ,S \
{
ZtUj ,U\Uj : t ∈ [T ]
}
;
12: end for
13: end for
14: end for
15: end for
16: for U ⊆ [K] do
17: MU = MU ∪ ZU ,∅;
18: end for
19: Multicast MU to users in U .
Theorem 6 indicates that Algorithm 3 provides a higher effective throughput for each user
than pure caching does. Even though no NE is used in Algorithm 3, Algorithm 3 is fair if it
is executed enough times and the user preferences are randomly generated each time. This is
because one user may gain extra advantage one time and may also suffer losses next time.
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Fig. 4. Achievable domain under UPAF policies for
(B, N,P)-Caching with two users and different preference
matrices.
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VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In the section, we present numerical results to validate the theoretical analysis and illustrate
the effective throughput gains from user cooperation. In the simulations, we assume that each
user independently requests one content item in the delivery phase. Therefore, the probability
measure P can be fully characterized by the user preference matrix P . Throughout this section,
we always assume that the users are equipped with buffers of identical sizes, bk = B for k ∈ [K].
To validate the performance of the proposed algorithms, we compare them with pure caching.
In Fig. 4, we consider (B, N,P)-Caching with two users and present the achievable domain
under UPAF policies for three different preference matrices. The number of content items and
the buffer size are set to be N = 20 and B = 1, respectively. Two types of user preferences
are considered, i.e., Zipf’s law pzipf =
[
1−1∑20
i=1 i
−1 , ...,
20−1∑20
i=1 i
−1
]
and uniform distribution punif =[
1
20
, ..., 1
20
]
. The three preference matrices are set to be
P1 =
pzipf
pzipf
 ,P2 =
punif
pzipf
 ,P3 =
punif
punif
 .
It is seen that UPAF policies always attain larger achievable domains than pure caching policies
do, which demonstrates the potential of improving the effective throughput by user cooperation.
Corresponding to the analysis in Section III-B, the achievable domains under UPAF policies are
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Fig. 6. Effective throughput versus preference difference β for
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Fig. 7. Effective throughput versus buffer size for (B, N,P)-
Caching with two users.
polygons. When P = P1 or P3, the achievable domains have reflectional symmetry. This is
because user 1 and user 2 have the same preference distribution. When P = P2, the preference
of user 2 is more concentrated. In this case, the achievable domain under P2 loses the reflectional
symmetry and user 2 can obtain higher maximum effective throughput than user 1 does.
In Fig. 5, we present the achievable domain under UPAF policies for (B, N,P)-Caching with
two users and different buffer sizes. The preference matrix is set to be P = P2. It is not surprising
that the larger the buffer size, the larger the achievable domain. Again, the achievable domains
under UPAF policies are polygons and user 2 obtain higher maximum effective throughput than
user 1 does.
To illustrate the advantage of user cooperation, we consider a (B, N,P)-Caching with two
users, where the number of content items and the buffer size are set to be N = 4 and B = 2.
The preference matrix is given by
P (β) =
0.25 + 0.75β 0.25(1− β) 0.25(1− β) 0.25(1− β)
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
 .
The user preference of user 1 is a linear combination of two vectors, [0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25] and
[1, 0, 0, 0]. Thus the parameter β describes the preference difference between the two users and
how concentrated the user 1’s preference is. Fig. 6 presents the effective throughput versus β. It
can be seen that cooperative games always reach higher effective throughputs than noncooperative
games and pure caching do. The effective throughput of user 1 increases with β, which validates
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again that more concentrated preferences helps to create higher effective throughputs. Under the
setting in the simulation, user cooperation can even bring over 25% additional effective through-
put. In contrast, effective throughput of user 2 decreases with β. That is because concentrated
preference helps user 1 to dominate the game between the two users. Theorem 4 ensures that
there exists a PSNE when β is small. In the simulations, Algorithm 1 always finds a PSNE
for β varying from 0 to 1 (T and ε are set to be 100 and 10−5 respectively). We also tested
Algorithm 1 for different B, N, and randomly generated P . Algorithm 1 returned a PSNE with
probability exceeding 90%. Simulations demonstrate that a PSNE exists on a scale greater than
that Theorem 4 characterizes.
Fig. 7 presents effective throughput versus buffer size for (B, N,P)-Caching with two users.
The parameter β in the preference matrix P (β) is set to be β = 0.5. It is not surprising to
see that the effective throughputs always increase with the buffer size. Again, user 1 dominates
the games and always obtains a higher effective throughput than user 2 does. User cooperation
can bring a considerable increase in effective throughput. When the buffer size is small, the
gap between cooperative game and noncooperative game is small. That is because multicasting
opportunities are few due to the lack of side information. When the buffer size tends to the
number of content items, the gaps between cooperative game, noncooperative game, and pure
caching shrink, because few data need to be transmitted in the delivery phase.
Fig. 8 presents effective throughput versus buffer size for (B, N,P)-Caching in the general
multiuser case. In the simulation, we consider there are three users and the preference matrix is
P4 =

0.7 0.2 0.1 0
0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
 .
For both Algorithm 3 and pure caching, the effective throughput increases with the buffer size.
Algorithm 3 always achieves a higher effective throughput than pure caching does. However,
the gap between Algorithm 3 and pure caching shrinks with increasing the buffer size. That is
because the effective throughput gain of Algorithm 3 mainly comes from multicasting for small
buffer size. In Fig. 8, user 1 always obtains a higher effective throughput than user 2 does, and
user 2 always achieves a higher effective throughput than user 3 does. The more concentrated
the preference, the higher effective throughput the user can obtain.
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VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the impact of heterogeneous user preferences on effective
throughput in cache-aided networks. In particular, the effective throughput is defined by splitting
the transmission costs and can be viewed as the number of equivalent cache hits in each user’s
buffer. It has been proved that the achievable domain of effective throughputs is a convex set and
can be totally characterized by its boundary in the positive orthant. For (B, N,P)-Caching with
two users, both theoretical analysis and simulation results have demonstrated that the achievable
domain under UPAF policies is a polygon. A noncooperative game has been formulated to
investigate Nash equilibria between the two users. It has been proved that the noncooperative
game has PSNEs if user preferences are similar. A low-complexity algorithm has been proposed
to provide a PSNE for the noncooperative game with high probability. In addition, an effective
throughput allocation scheme has been given based on a cooperative game. For (B, N,P)-
Caching in the general multiuser case, a feasible UPAF policy has also been proposed to organize
user cooperation. It has also been shown that user cooperation can bring significant caching gains
and the achievable domain of effective throughputs expands with the increase of the buffer size.
Users with more concentrated preferences can obtain higher effective throughputs. Significant
future topics include games for (B, N,P)-Caching with multiple users, practical user preference
analysis based on real data, and the analysis of effective throughput in cache-aided D2D networks
and heterogeneous networks.
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